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Abstract 
The current study aimed to test a key theoretical prediction of Rational Emotive Behaviour 
Therapy theory by assessing the role of general and trauma-specific irrational beliefs in the 
prediction of posttraumatic stress responses. A sample (N = 313) of trauma-exposed 
emergency service workers participated in the study. Structural equation modelling results 
demonstrated that an REBT-based model provided satisfactory model fit and explained 89% 
of variance in posttraumatic stress symptomology. Theoretical predictions were supported 
with results demonstrating that general-level irrationality indirectly impacted posttraumatic 
stress responses via a set of trauma-specific irrational beliefs. Results indicate the importance 
of irrational beliefs in predicting posttraumatic stress responses.  
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Introduction 
Substantial empirical evidence has been obtained to support both the efficacy and 
effectiveness of trauma-focused cognitive-behavioural therapy (TF-CBT) for posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD; Bisson, Ehlers, Matthews, Pilling, Richards & Turner, 2007; 
Hofmann, Asnaani, Vonk, Sawyer & Fang, 2012). Therapeutic strategies for treating PTSD 
derive directly from theoretical cognitive models. In Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) highly 
influential model of PTSD two cognitive processes are deemed critical in the development 
and maintenance of the disorder. First, there is an overly negative interpretation of the 
traumatic event and its sequelea, and second, there is a poor elaboration of the memory of the 
traumatic incident and insufficient integration of the trauma memory within one’s 
autobiographical memory.  
 Clark and Beck (2010) have presented an updated cognitive model of PTSD in which 
traumatic experiences are hypothesised to interact with pre-existing schematic vulnerability 
factors. This gives rise to a range of maladaptive beliefs about the self, others, the world, the 
future, and the traumatic event itself. The presence of these belief systems has a negative 
impact on a number of cognitive processes leading to faulty trauma memories and attentional 
cognitive biases towards threatening stimuli. Such processes are hypothesised to produce the 
characteristic intrusive and hyperarousal symptoms which are consequently appraised in a 
negative manner leading to maladaptive behavioural control strategies which involve 
avoidance and emotion control/suppression efforts.  
 A range of psychometrically validated measures of specific cognitions relevant to 
PTSD derived from these theoretical models have been developed (e.g., Foa, Ehlers, Clark, 
Tolin & Orsillo, 1999; Vogt, Shipherd & Resick, 2012). In a recent study based upon the 
Ehlers and Clark (2000) model of PTSD, Kleim et al. (2013), utilizing sophisticated latent 
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growth modelling procedures, demonstrated for the first time that changes in dysfunctional 
cognitions (as measured by a shortened version of the Posttraumatic Cognition Inventory) 
significantly predicted subsequent reductions in PTSD symptomology. These findings 
strongly support the role of dysfunctional cognitions as key mechanisms of change in PTSD 
symptomology.  
 These cognitive models of PTSD are all based upon the general theoretical foundation 
of Beck’s Cognitive Therapy model of psychopathology (e.g., Beck, 2011). An alternative 
CBT model of psychopathology which has received comparatively little empirical attention 
in the context of PTSD is Ellis’ Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT; Ellis, 2001). 
Although the theoretical models of Cognitive Therapy and REBT share much in common, 
important differences do exist, particularly with respect to the key etiopathogenetic cognitive 
variables in the development and maintenance of psychopathology (Hyland & Boduszek, 
2012). Investigation of the role of the cognitive variables outlined in REBT theory offers the 
possibility of identifying additional critical dysfunctional cognitions associated with PTSD 
symptomology. 
 From the perspective of REBT theory the current cognitive models and psychometric 
measures of PTSD are incomplete. Contemporary REBT theory (David, Lynn & Ellis, 2010) 
describes four main irrational belief processes: (i) Demandingness beliefs are rigid 
imperatives directed toward the self, others, or the external environment for how things “must 
be”, “have to be”, “ought to be”, or “absolutely should be”: (ii) Catastrophizing beliefs are 
extreme negative evaluations of unpleasant life events: (iii) Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs 
involve appraisals of a negative event as unbearable and intolerable: and (iv) Depreciation 
beliefs reflect global negative evaluations of the self, others, and of life events. REBT theory 
proposes that Demandingness beliefs represent the core cognitive construct in the emergence 
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and maintenance of psychopathological responses and their impact on such outcomes will be 
mediated through the secondary irrational belief processes of Catastrophizing, Low 
Frustration Tolerance, and Depreciation beliefs (David, Schnur & Belloiu, 2002; DiLorenzo, 
David & Montgomery, 2007). Recent empirical findings have provided further support for 
this hypothesised organisation of the irrational beliefs specifically in the context of PTSD. 
Through the application of structural equation modelling techniques Hyland, Shevlin, 
Adamson, and Boduszek (2013a) demonstrated that Demandingness beliefs indirectly 
impacted on each symptom group of PTSD via each of the secondary irrational belief 
processes. 
 The majority of evidence that exists in support of the predictions of REBT theory has 
been obtained through empirical investigation of the role of general-level irrational beliefs. 
REBT theory however predicts that disorder-specific variants of the irrational beliefs should 
mediate the impact of more generalised forms of irrational beliefs on emotional distress 
(Dryden, 2009), and that disorder-specific irrational beliefs should act as superior predictors 
of psychopathology as compared to the more generalised forms utilized in most research 
programs. Unfortunately very little research has been undertaken within the REBT domain to 
explore this central hypothesis. 
 DiLorenzo, David and Montgomery (2011) investigated the differential contributions 
of general-level and disorder-specific irrational beliefs in the emergence of exam related 
distress among 86 female students at two time periods (T1: start of term, and T2: immediately 
prior to the sitting of an exam at the end of term). They found that disorder-specific irrational 
beliefs were a better predictor of exam related distress than were general-level irrational 
beliefs when distress was measured immediately prior to the taking of an exam. When exam-
related distress was measured at time 1 (start of term) neither general-level nor disorder-
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specific irrational beliefs had an independent effect on distress. These results suggest that 
disorder-specific irrational beliefs make a contribution to the explanation of distress beyond 
the contribution of general-level irrational beliefs. 
 Moldovan (2009) examined the mediating role of specific illness related irrational 
beliefs in the relationship between general-level irrational beliefs and emotional distress. This 
study included a small sample of 56 cancer and type-II diabetes patients. Moldovan’s results 
found that illness-specific irrational beliefs fully mediated the relationship between general-
level irrational beliefs and depression, anxiety, and stress levels, respectively. Although these 
findings are consistent with the predictions of REBT theory, the low sample size and use of a 
cross-sectional research design in the establishment of mediation means that substantially 
more research is required in order to corroborate these findings. 
 REBT theory has been criticised (Padesky & Beck, 2003) as an overly monolithic 
therapy that is not well suited to adequately conceptualising the unique cognitive features of 
specific disorders such as PTSD due its focus on just a few core irrational belief processes. 
David, Szentagotai, Kallay and Macavei (2005) responded to this criticism by pointing out 
that while REBT theory fully incorporates the “cognitive content specificity hypothesis” of 
Cognitive Therapy theory (Riskind, 2004), the advantage of a reductionist approach favoured 
by REBT is an ability to explain the development of a range of psychological disorders in 
terms of the interactions between just a few irrational belief processes. David et al. (2005) 
point out that the REBT approach is similar to the approach to understanding 
psychopathology employed within the field of neuroscience where various forms of 
psychopathology are explained in terms of a small group of neurotransmitters, and the 
interactions that take place between them. David, Schnur and Belloiu (2002) have put forth a 
proposed model for the development of specific disorders based upon the interplay between 
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the primary (Demandingness) and secondary (Catastrophizing, Low Frustration Tolerance, 
and Depreciation) general-level irrational belief processes. Depression, for example, is 
hypothesised to involve Demandingness and self-Depreciation beliefs, while anxiety 
disorders are hypothesised to involve relationships between Demandingness beliefs and 
Catastrophizing and/or Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs. Research testing these 
individualised REBT models of psychopathology is still in its infancy and little empirical 
research exists to either confirm or reject the predictions of David and his colleagues (2002). 
Another plausible route towards the development of disorder-specific REBT models of 
psychopathology is the inclusion of disorder-specific variants of the irrational beliefs within a 
respective theoretical model. 
 The REBT research community has unquestionably failed to keep pace with the 
Cognitive Therapy community in terms of developing disorder-specific cognitive models of 
psychopathology. However, given the degree of empirical support for REBT theory and the 
importance of identifying additional dysfunctional cognitive processes associated with 
posttraumatic stress symptomology, investigation of the cognitive variables outlined in REBT 
theory appears highly warranted. Interestingly, in recent years a good deal of empirical work 
has indicated the importance of ‘distress intolerance’ beliefs in posttraumatic stress responses 
(Marshall-Berenz, Vujanovic, Bonn-Miller, Bernstein & Zvolensky, 2010; Vujanovic, Bonn-
Miller, Potter, Marshall-Berenz & Zvolensky, 2011), a cognitive variable that shares a 
substantial degree of conceptual overlap with Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs. 
 The current study includes two primary objectives. The first is to test a central 
theoretical prediction of REBT theory regarding the indirect relationship between general-
level irrational beliefs and posttraumatic stress responses via a set of trauma-specific 
irrational beliefs. The second objective is to provide evidence to the wider CBT community 
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regarding the important role of irrational beliefs, as described by REBT theory, in 
posttraumatic stress responses. The hypothesised indirect relationship between general-level 
irrational beliefs and posttraumatic stress symptoms via trauma-specific irrational beliefs will 
be investigated using structural equation modelling (SEM) techniques. Two alternative 
models will be tested; the first is a fully indirect model while the second assumes both a 
direct effect of general-level irrational beliefs on posttraumatic stress symptomology along 
with an indirect effect through trauma-specific irrational beliefs. 
Methods 
Participants and Procedures 
The sample for the current study consisted of three hundred and thirteen (N = 313) trauma-
exposed emergency service personnel (police, military, and related emergency service 
workers) recruited from active duty while serving in the Republic of Ireland and the Republic 
of Kosovo over a twelve month period (June 2011 – June 2012). All participants in the 
current study had experienced a ‘Criterion A’ trauma as outlined in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV-Text Revised (DSM-IV-TR: American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). The most commonly reported traumatic event was being involved in a 
serious accident (60.4%, n = 189), followed by a non-sexual assault by a stranger (56.9%, n = 
178), and military combat (42.5%, n = 133). The sample included 212 males (67.7%) and 101 
females (32.3%) and these individuals ranged in age from 23 to 65, with a mean age of 38.18 
years (SD = 8.70). Participants were informed of the nature of the study either by a member 
of the research team or an assigned liaison for a particular organisation, and each 
participant’s involvement in the research project was voluntary. No obligations were placed 
upon potential respondents nor were any inducements employed to recruit the sample. 
Materials 
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The Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS: Foa, Cashman, Jaycox & Perry, 
1997) is a 49-item self-report measure of the severity of posttraumatic stress symptomology 
related to a particular traumatic event. The PDS assess all aspects of a PTSD diagnosis from 
Criteria A to F as outlined in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The 
PDS measures the nature of the traumatic experience, the duration of the experienced 
symptoms, the impact of the experienced symptoms on daily functioning, and the severity of 
the symptoms. Seventeen items measure each of the identified symptoms of PTSD along a 
four-point Likert scale. Respondents rate the severity of each symptom from a score of 0 
("not at all or only one time") to 3 ("5 or more times a week / almost always"). This produces 
a total range of scores from 0 to 51 with higher scores indicating higher levels of 
posttraumatic stress symptomology. The PDS possess strong psychometric properties with 
Griffin, Uhlmansiek, Resick, and Mechanic (2004) demonstrating that it shares a strong 
correlation (r = .71) with the Clinician-Administered PTSD scale (Blake et al., 1995).  
The Abbreviated Version of the Attitudes and Belief Scale 2 (AV-ABS2: Hyland, 
Shevlin, Adamson & Boduszek, 2013b) is a 24-item self-report measure of general rational 
and irrational beliefs, as defined by current REBT theory (David et al., 2010). The AV-ABS2 
measures all four Irrational Belief processes (Demandingness, Catastrophizing, Low 
Frustration Tolerance, and Depreciation) and all four Rational Belief processes (Preferences, 
Non-Catastrophizing, High Frustration Tolerance, and Acceptance). Each subscale is 
measured via three items. The construct validity of the AV-ABS2 has been demonstrated in a 
previous confirmatory factor analytic study (Hyland et al., 2013b), and its psychometric 
properties were demonstrated to be superior to the full length Attitudes and Beliefs Scale-2 
(DiGiuseppe, Leaf, Exner, & Robin, 1988). Items of the AV-ABS2 include, “I must do well 
at important things, and I will not accept it if I do not do well” (Demandingness): “It's awful 
 11 
 
to be disliked by people who are important to me, and it is a catastrophe if they don't like me” 
(Catastrophizing): “Its unbearable being uncomfortable, tense or nervous and I can't stand it 
when I am” (Low Frustration Tolerance): and “If I do not perform well at tasks that are very 
important to me, it is because I am a worthless bad person” (Depreciation). Items are scored 
along a five-point Likert scale from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly Agree”), with 
higher scores in each case indicating higher levels of the respective variable. Possible scores 
of each subscale range from 3-15. The AV-ABS2 exhibited satisfactory internal consistency 
with all subscales recording a Cronbach’s Alpha level above .80. 
 In order to measure trauma-specific variants of each of the four irrational belief 
processes a new scale called the Trauma-Related Irrational Belief Scale (TRIBS) was 
constructed for the current study (see Appendix A for the full scale). The TRIBS is an 8-item 
self-report measure of irrational beliefs specifically related to the experience of a traumatic 
life event. The scale was constructed in accordance with guidelines set forth by Montgomery, 
et al. (2007) in the development of their ‘Exam-Related Belief Scale’ which was used to 
capture rational and irrational beliefs specifically related to the context of exam-related 
distress. The TRIBS includes sub-scales for each of the four irrational belief processes and 
each belief process is measured via two items. Items of the TRIBS are scored along a five-
point Likert scale from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly Agree”). Items 4 and 6 
included in the scale were scored in a reverse direction. Scores on each subscale range from 
2-10 with higher scores reflecting higher levels of irrationality. Internal consistency for the 
full scale was satisfactory (α = .95), and each of the subscales also yielded acceptable results 
with all alpha levels exceeding .80. 
Analysis 
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Descriptive statistics and preliminary analysis were conducted within Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS) 20. The theoretical models illustrated in figures 1 and 2, 
respectively, were analysed using structural equation modelling (SEM) techniques. SEM is a 
combination of two analytical procedures; confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) which assesses 
the measurement component of a theoretical model, and path analysis which assesses the 
relationship between latent variables. Within an SEM framework, the structural and 
measurement elements of analysis are estimated simultaneously (McCallum & Austin, 2000). 
A number of other features make the use of SEM procedures appropriate for the current 
analysis. These include controlling for systematic and random measurement error and the 
ability to simultaneous test for both direct and indirect effects within a model (Bollen, 1989). 
The SEM analysis was conducted in Mplus version 6.0 (Muthen & Muthen, 1998 – 2010) 
with Robust Maximum Likelihood (MLR) estimation. 
 The overall fit of each model and the relative fit between models were assessed using 
a range of goodness-of-fit statistics and assessment of the appropriateness of the model 
parameters. The chi-square (χ2) statistic assessed the sample and implied covariance matrix 
and a good fitting model is indicated by a non-significant result. However the chi-square 
statistic is strongly associated with sample size, and as such good models tend to be over-
rejected. Therefore Tanaka (1987) suggested that a model should not be rejected simply on 
the basis of a significant chi-square result. Accordingly, it is recommended that researchers 
examine the ratio of the chi-square value to the degrees of freedom (df), and according to 
Klein (1994), any model with a χ2-to-df ratio of less than 3:1 indicates a good fitting model. 
The Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) and the Tucker Lewis Index (TLI; Tucker & 
Lewis, 1973) are measures of how much better the model fits the data compared to a baseline 
model where all variables are uncorrelated. For these indices values above .90 indicate 
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reasonable fit while values above .95 indicate good model fit (Bentler, 1990; Hu & Bentler, 
1999). In addition, two more absolute indices are presented; the standardized root mean-
square residual (SRMR: Joreskog & Sorborn, 1981) and the root mean-square error of 
approximation (RMSEA: Steiger, 1990). Ideally these indices should be less than .05 
however values less than .08 also suggest adequate fit (Bentler, 1990; Hu & Bentler, 1999; 
Joreskog & Sorborn, 1993). Furthermore, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1974) 
was used to evaluate the alternative models, with the smaller value indicating the best fitting 
model. The CFI, RMSEA and the AIC all have explicit penalties for model complexity. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics and Factor Correlations 
The mean level of posttraumatic stress symptomology (PTS) for the entire sample was 11.40 
(SD = 10.77; scores ranged from 0-41). The mean scores for general irrationality was 28.32 
(SD = 14.16; scores ranged from 12-60) and the mean scores for trauma-specific irrationality 
was 18.39 (SD = 10.44; score ranged from 8-40). All correlations between the latent variables 
were positive and statistically significant. General irrationality (r = .86, p < .001) and trauma-
specific irrationality (r = .94, p < .001), were both strongly associated with levels of PTS. 
General irrationality and trauma-specific irrationality were also highly correlated (r = .91, p < 
.001).  
Measurement Models 
Based on extensive findings regarding the factor structure of posttraumatic stress indicators 
(e.g., Yufik & Simms, 2010), three alternative models of the PDS (Foa et al., 1997) were 
investigated. Model 1 is a four-factor solution (Intrusions, Avoidance, Emotional Numbing, 
and Hyperarousal) first suggested by King, Leskin, King and Weathers (1998); Model 2 is an 
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alternative four-factor solution (Intrusions, Avoidance, Dysphoria, Hyperarousal) first 
suggested by Simms, Watson and Doebbeling (2002); and Model 3 is the DSM-IV-TR’s 
three-factorial solution. The Simms et al. ‘Dysphoria’ model was found to be the best fitting 
model yielding the most impressive fit statistics (χ2 = 152.94, df = 113, p < .001; CFI = .98; 
TLI = .98, RMSEA = .03; SRMR = .03) along with the lowest AIC value. These four 
subscales were consequently used as measured variables within the full structural model in 
order to construct a posttraumatic stress (PTS) latent variable.  
Structural Model 
The REBT fully indirect model of PTS (Figure 1) was thus developed and included three 
latent variables: (i) General Irrationality measured via the four general-level irrational belief 
subscales of the AV-ABS-2; (ii) Trauma-Specific Irrationality measured via the four trauma-
specific irrational belief subscales of the TRIBS; and (iii) PTS measured via Intrusions, 
Avoidance, Dysphoria, and Hyperarousal. Factor loadings for each measured variable on 
their respective latent variable were all statistically significant, positive, and greater than 0.60 
(see Table 1 for full details). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The fully indirect REBT model of PTS produced satisfactory model fit statistics (χ2 = 84.80, 
df = 52, p = .003; RMSEA = .05 (CI 90% = .03/.06); SRMR = .02; CFI = .99; TLI = .98; AIC 
= 20145.69) and explained 89% of the variance in posttraumatic stress symptoms. As can be 
seen in Figure 1, General Irrationality had a statistically significant, positive, and strong 
direct impact on Trauma-Specific Irrationality (β = .91, p < .001), while Trauma-Specific 
Irrationality also displayed a statistically significant, positive, and strong direct effect on PTS 
(β = .94, p < .001). Additionally, a statistically significant, positive, and strong indirect effect 
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was observed between General Irrationality and PTS via Trauma-Specific Irrationality (β = 
.86, p < .001). 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The direct and indirect model REBT model PTS produced similar fit statistics to the fully 
indirect model (χ2 = 84.926, df = 51, p = .003; RMSEA = .05 (CI 90% = .03-.06); SRMR = 
.02; CFI = .98; TLI = .98; AIC = 20149.20) accounted for 88% of the variance in levels of 
PTS. As can be seen in Figure 2, General Irrationality had a statistically significant, positive, 
direct, and strong impact on Trauma-Specific Irrationality (β = .91, p < .001), while Trauma-
Specific Irrationality again was found to have a statistically significant, positive, strong, 
direct impact on PTS (β = .86, p < .001). Importantly however, no statistically significant 
direct effect was observed between General Irrationality and PTS. The indirect effect 
remained statistically significant between General Irrationality and PTS via Trauma-Specific 
Irrationality, however this relationship was slightly lower than within the fully indirect model 
(β = .81, p < .001). 
[Insert figure 2 here] 
Discussion 
The current study was performed in order to substantially develop PTSD-based research 
within the REBT community specifically, and to contribute evidence to the wider scientific 
community regarding the role of irrational beliefs as potentially important dysfunctional 
cognitions in posttraumatic stress responses. REBT theory is explicit in predicting that 
context-specific variants of each irrational belief process should not only directly influence 
various psychopathological outcomes (Ellis, 2001), but that they should also serve as a 
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mediator between more generalised forms of irrational beliefs and psychopathological 
responses (Dryden, 2009).   
 In order to empirically test this hypothesis, two theoretically derived REBT models of 
posttraumatic stress symptomology were developed. The first model was in-line with REBT 
theory (Dryden, 2009) and predicted that general-level irrationality would impact upon 
posttraumatic stress symptoms indirectly via a set of trauma-specific irrationality. The second 
model reflected a slightly modified version of REBT theory and assumed a direct relationship 
between general irrationality and posttraumatic stress symptomology, along with the 
expected indirect relationship via trauma-specific irrationality. 
 The results of the SEM analysis indicated that both the models of posttraumatic stress 
responses were a good fit of the data. It was difficult to identify a superior model based upon 
the incremental and absolute model fit statistics. The fully indirect model was found to be 
superior only on the basis of the TLI results. AIC values which are used to compare 
alternative models also suggested both that models were practically indistinguishable 
however the fully indirect model did record a marginally lower value suggesting it to be 
statistically superior. On the basis of these results in addition to the fact that the fully indirect 
model possesses fewer model parameters and is consistent with the general REBT model of 
psychopathology, the fully indirect model was preferred on the grounds of parsimony and 
theoretical consistency. 
Dryden (2009) has theorised that the activation of general-level irrational beliefs 
during an activating event biases information processing leading to the development of 
dysfunctional automatic thoughts, which are then evaluated by means of context-specific 
irrational beliefs. These context-specific irrational beliefs are expected to derive from more 
general-level irrational beliefs that are already a component of one’s cognitive architecture. 
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In others words, general-level irrational beliefs are viewed as critical factors in the 
development and maintenance of psychopathological responses however these beliefs are 
hypothesised to indirectly impact psychopathological responses by leading to the creation of 
context-specific irrational beliefs. This general REBT theoretical formulation shares much in 
common with Clark and Beck’s (2010) updated cognitive model of PTSD.  
Results of the current study are in line with Dryden’s (2009) predictions as general-
level irrationality was found to exert a strong direct effect on trauma-specific irrationality, but 
no direct effect was observed between general-level irrationality and posttraumatic stress 
symptomology. The direct effect between trauma-specific irrationality and posttraumatic 
stress symptomology was found to be very strong, supporting Ellis’ (2001) argument that 
context-specific versions of the various irrational belief processes offer a potent predictor of 
psychologically distressing outcomes.  
The current findings suggest that the presence of general-level irrational beliefs 
(Demandingness beliefs, Catastrophizing beliefs, Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs, and 
Depreciation beliefs) within an individual’s cognitive architecture represent important 
cognitive vulnerability factors for the development of posttraumatic stress reactions, while 
the more context-specific variants of these cognitive processes (associated with the 
individual’s traumatic experience) appear to be a more proximate predictor of such 
psychopathological responses.  
The fully indirect REBT model was found to explain 89% of variance in 
posttraumatic stress symptoms, thus providing strong evidence that the irrational beliefs, as 
outlined in REBT theory, play a crucially important role in posttraumatic stress responses. 
REBT theory states that Demandingness beliefs represent the core psychological construct in 
the emergence of psychological distress, and that their impact on psychopathological 
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responses is mediated through the secondary irrational belief processes of Catastrophizing, 
Low Frustration Tolerance, and/or Depreciation beliefs. This contention has drawn criticism 
from many within the Cognitive Therapy community (e.g., Padesky & Beck, 2003) however 
recently empirical work has provided support for this core REBT hypothesis (David et al., 
2002; David et al., 2005; Hyland et al., 2013; Soloman et al., 2003; and Szentagotai et al., 
2008). Results from the current analysis add additional support to previous findings 
demonstrating the accuracy of the theoretical predictions of REBT in general, and also add 
original evidence to the scientific literature regarding the importance of irrational beliefs in 
explaining posttraumatic stress responses, specifically.     
 Current findings lend considerable empirical support for our suggestion that REBT 
theory can convincingly overcome the reasonable criticisms of Padesky and Beck (2003) that 
REBT is an overly monolithic approach that is incapable of formulating individualized and 
disorder-specific models of psychopathology. While REBT theory has generally always 
favoured a more transdiagnostic approach to conceptualising psychopathology, the current 
study suggests that it is possible for the REBT community to substantially develop its 
theoretical base through the development of more disorder-specific models of 
psychopathology by placing an emphasis on conceptualizing, measuring, and evaluating the 
role of disorder-specific irrational beliefs in the development and maintenance of various 
forms of psychopathology. In doing so, not only can the field of REBT flourish but the wider 
scientific community can be enriched by such theoretical advancements and discoveries. 
 Although there is considerable evidence attesting to the importance of each irrational 
belief process described by REBT theory in a range of psychopathologies (Browne, Dowd & 
Freeman, 2010; Dryden & David, 2008), these cognitive constructs have generally not yet 
been integrated within mainstream cognitive-behavioural models of PTSD. Current and past 
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results (Hyland et al., 2013a) suggest that these irrational belief processes have an important 
role to play in the development and maintenance of posttraumatic stress reactions, and that 
their rational belief counterparts are critical factors in protecting against the development of 
posttraumatic stress responses (Hyland, Shevlin, Adamson, & Boduszek, 2013c), therefore 
greater consideration of both general-level and trauma-specific irrational beliefs could 
potentially yield greater theoretical understandings of the cognitive architecture upon which 
posttraumatic stress responses rest, and lead to more efficacious treatment interventions. 
Substantially more evidence is certainly required before any firm conclusions can be drawn 
regarding the importance of the irrational beliefs in predicting the development of PTSD. 
These studies are limited considerably due to the cross-sectional nature of the study designs 
and future work should ideally seek to replicate the design of Kleim and colleagues (2013) in 
evaluating the role of irrational belief in PTSD symptomology. 
 As with any research endeavour, the current study contains a number of limitations 
which need to be considered. The most salient limitation of the current study relates to the 
attempt to test predictions of mediation with the use of cross-sectional data. Given that the 
current study was cross-sectional in nature it was impossible to ascertain whether trauma-
specific irrationality mediated the relationship between general-level irrationality and 
posttraumatic stress symptomology due to the temporal assumptions inherent in determining 
causality which mediation implies. Although results of the current study are in-line with the 
predictions of REBT theory the possibility remains that the development of trauma-specific 
irrationality in the immediate aftermath of a trauma could generalise and lead to the 
emergence of more general-level irrationality. Although this is contrary to theoretical 
prediction such an occurrence is plausible and cannot be ruled out within cross-sectional 
designs therefore future research efforts should ideally seek to utilize longitudinal data in 
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order to test this possibility. Furthermore, a self-report measure of posttraumatic stress 
symptoms was employed and although self-report measures of PTSD, such as the PDS (Foa 
et al., 1997) used in the current study, have been shown to highly correspond with clinician-
administered measures (Griffin et al., 2004), clinician-based measures would have been 
preferable as they are considered the gold standard method of assessing PTSD 
symptomology. 
In conclusion, this study originally contributes to both the trauma and REBT literature 
in a number of important ways. The current study is the first of its kind to apply latent 
variable modelling techniques to determine the direct and indirect effects of trauma-specific 
irrational beliefs among a sample of participants experiencing posttraumatic stress symptoms. 
Given the strength of the direct effects observed between trauma-specific irrationality and 
posttraumatic stress symptomology, as well as the level of variance explained in such 
symptoms due to both general and trauma-specific irrational beliefs, this study has 
highlighted the importance of a set of cognitive variables that are currently ignored within  
current cognitive-behavioural models of PTSD. 
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Appendix 
 
 
The Trauma Related Irrational Belief Scale 
 
As you answer the following questions please think about the traumatic event you described 
in the previous section of this questionnaire. 
 
For each statement below please indicate whether you Strongly Disagree (A), Somewhat 
Disagree (B), are Neutral (C), Somewhat Agree (D), or Strongly Agree (E). 
 
 
 
A 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
B 
SOMEWHAT 
DISAGREE 
C 
NEUTRAL 
D 
SOMEWHAT 
AGREE 
E 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
 
 
1. I absolutely should have acted differently during the 
traumatic event that I experienced. 
 
A B C D E 
2. The traumatic event that I experienced absolutely should not 
have happened. 
 
A B C D E 
3. The traumatic event that I experienced was completely awful 
and catastrophic; the worst thing that could have happened. 
 
A B C D E 
4. The traumatic event that I experience was extremely bad and 
unpleasant but it wasn’t the worst thing that could have 
happened. 
 
A B C D E 
5. I can’t stand the fact that I had to experience this traumatic 
event and I find it hard to experience any kind of happiness 
as a result. 
 
A B C D E 
6. Although I don’t like the fact that I experienced this 
traumatic event, I can stand the fact that it happened, and I 
find that I can experience happiness despite it. 
 
A B C D E 
7. I think that I am less worthwhile as a person because of what 
happened during the traumatic event. 
 
A B C D E 
8. I think that life is less worthwhile because of what happened 
during the traumatic event. 
 
A B C D E 
 
 
 22 
 
References 
Akaike, H. (1974). A new look at the statistical model identification. IEEE Transactions on
  Automatic Control, 19, 716–723. 
American Psychiatric Association (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
  disorders. (4th ed., rev.). Washington, DC: Author. 
Anderson, J. C., & Gerbing, D. W. (1988). Structural equation modeling in practice: A 
 review and recommended two-step approach. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 411–423. 
Beck, J. S. (2011). Cognitive behaviour therapy: Basics and beyond (2nd ed.). 
 London: The Guilford Press.  
Bentler, P. M. (1990). Comparative fit indices in structural models. Psychological Bulletin, 
 107, 238–246. 
Bisson, J. I., Ehlers, A., Matthews, R., Pilling, S., Richards, D., & Turner, S. (2007). 
  Psychological treatments for chronic post-traumatic stress disorder. The British 
  Journal of Psychiatry, 190, 97–104. 
Blake, D. D., Weathers, F. W., Nagy, L. M., Kaloupek, G. D., Charney, D. S., & Keane, T.
  M. (1998). The Clinican-Administered PTSDD Scale for DSM-IV. Boston: National
  Centre for PTSD, Behavioural Science Division. 
Bollen, K. A. (1989). Structural equations with latent variables. New York: Wiley. 
Browne, M. W., & Cudeck, R. (1989). Single sample cross-validation indices for  covariance 
 structures. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 24, 445-455.  
 23 
 
Browne, M. W., & Cudeck, R. (1993). Alternative ways of assessing model fit. In K. A. 
  Bollen & J. S. Long (Eds.), Testing structural equation models (pp. 136-162). 
 Newsbury Park, CA: Sage.  
Browne, C. M., Dowd, E. T., & Freeman, A. (2010). Rational and irrational beliefs and 
 psychopathology. In David, D., Lynn, S. J., & Ellis, A. Rational and irrational 
  beliefs: Research, theory, and clinical practice (p. 3-22). Oxford: Oxford University
  Press. 
Clark, D. A., & Beck, A. T. (2010). Cognitive therapy of anxiety disorders. London: The 
  Guilford Press. 
Cohen, J., & Cohen, P. (1983).  Applied multiple regression/correlation analysis for the 
  behavioral sciences (2nd  Ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
David, D., Lynn, S. J., & Ellis, A. (2010) Rational and irrational beliefs: Research, theory,
  and clinical practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
David, D., Szentagotai, A., Lupu, V., & Cosman, D. (2008). Rational-emotive behaviour 
  therapy versus cognitive therapy versus medication in the treatment of major 
  depressive disorder: A randomized clinical trial. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 6,
  728–746. 
David, D., Szentagotai, A., Kallay, E., & Macavei, B. (2005). A synopsis of rational-emotive
  behavior therapy (REBT): Fundamental and applied research. Journal of Rational-
 Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 23, 175–221. 
 24 
 
David, D., Schnur, J., & Belloiu, A. (2002). Another search for the “hot” cognitions: 
  Appraisal, irrational beliefs, attributions, and their relation to emotion. Journal of 
  Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 15, 93–131. 
DiGiuseppe, R., Leaf, R., Exner, T., & Robin, M.V. (1988). The development of a measure of
  rational / irrational thinking. Paper presented at the World Congress of Behavior 
  Therapy, Edinburg, Scotland. 
DiLorenzo, T. A., David, D., & Montgomery, G. H. (2007). The interrelations between 
  irrational cognitive processes and distress in stressful academic settings. Personality
  and Individual Differences, 42, 765-777. 
DiLorenzo, T. A., David, D., & Montgomery, G. H. (2011). The impact of general and 
  specific rational and irrational beliefs on exam distress; A further investigation of the
  binary model of emotional distress as an emotional regulation model. Journal of 
  Cognitive and Behavioural Psychotherapies, 11, 121-142. 
Dryden, W. (2009). Understanding emotional problems: The REBT perspective. London: 
  Routledge. 
Dryden, W., & David, D. (2008). Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy: Current Status. 
 Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly, 22, 195-209. 
Ehlers, A., & Clark, D. M. (2000). A cognitive model of persistent posttraumatic stress 
  disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38, 319-345. 
Ellis, A. (2001). Overcoming destructive beliefs, feelings, and behaviours: New directions for
  rational emotive behaviour therapy. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books. 
 25 
 
Foa, E., Cashman, L., Jaycox, L., & Perry, K. (1997). The validation of a self-report measure
  of PTSD: The Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale. Psychological Assessment, 9, 445-
 451. 
Foa, E. B., Ehlers, A., Clark, D. M., Tolin, D. F., & Orsillo, S. M. (1999). The Posttraumatic
  Cognitions Inventory (PTCI): Development and validation. Psychological  
  Assessment, 11, 303–314. 
Griffin, M. G., Uhlmansiek, M. H., Resick, P. A., & Mechanic, M. B. (2004). Comparison of
  the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale versus the Clinician-Administered Posttraumatic
  Stress Disorder Scale in domestic violence survivors. Journal of Traumatic Stress,
  17, 497-503. 
Hofman, S. G., Asnaani, A., Vonk, I. J. J., Sawyer, A. T., & Fang, A. (2012). The efficacy of
  cognitive behavioral therapy: A review of meta-analyses. Cognitive Therapy and 
  Research, 36, 427-440. 
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. (1998). Fit indices in covariance structural modeling: Sensitivity to 
  underparameterized model misspecification. Psychological Methods, 3, 424- 453. 
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure 
  analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation 
  Modeling, 6, 1–55. 
Hyland, P., & Boduszek, D. (2012). Resolving a difference between cognitive therapy and
  rational emotive behaviour therapy: Towards the development of an integrated 
  CBT model of psychopathology. Mental Health Review Journal, 17, 104-116. 
 26 
 
Hyland, P., Shevlin, M., Adamson, G., & Boduszek, D. (2013a).  The organisation of 
  irrational beliefs in posttraumatic stress symptomology: Testing the predictions of 
 REBT theory using structural equation modelling. Journal of Clinical Psychology,  
 DOI: 10.1002/jclp.22009 
Hyland, P., Shevlin, M., Adamson, G., & Boduszek, D. (2013b). Modelling the structure of
  the attitudes and belief scale 2 using CFA and bifactor approaches: Toward the 
  development of an abbreviated version. Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 
 DOI:10.1080/16506073.2013.777467 
Hyland, P., Shevlin, M., Adamson, G., & Boduszek, D. (2013c). The moderating role of 
 rational beliefs in the relationship between irrational beliefs and posttraumatic stress
  symptomology. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, DOI: 
 10.1017/S1352465813000064 
Joreskog, K., & Sorbom, D. (1981). LISREL V: Analysis of linear structural relationships by
  the method of maximum likelihood. Chicago: National Educational Resources. 
Jöreskog, K., & Sörbom, D. (2004). Interactive Lisrel (8,72). Scientific Software  
  International. Inc. 
King, D., Leskin, G., King, L., & Weathers, F. (1998). Confirmatory factor analysis of the
  clinician administered PTSD Scale: Evidence for the dimensionality of posttraumatic
  stress disorder. Psychological Assessment, 10, 90–96. 
Kline, P. (1994). An easy guide to factor analysis. London: Routledge. 
Kleim, B., Grey, N., Wild, J., Nussbeck, F. W., Scott, R., Hackmann, A....Ehlers, A. (2013).
  Cognitive change predicts symptom reduction with cognitive therapy for  
 27 
 
  posttraumatic stress disorder. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 81, 
  383-393. 
MacCallum, R. C., & Austin, J. T. (2000). Applications of structural equation modeling in
  psychological research. Annual Review of Psychology, 51, 201–226. 
Marshall-Berenz, E. C., Vujanovic, A. A., Bonn-Miller, M. O., Bernstein, A., & Zvolensky,
  M. J. (2010). Multi-method study of distress tolerance and PTSD symptom severity
  in a trauma-exposed community sample. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 23, 623–630. 
Moldovan, R. (2009). An analysis of the impact of irrational beliefs and illness  
  representations in predicting distress in cancer and type II diabetes patients. 
  Cognition, Brain, Behaviour: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 13, 179-193. 
Montgomery, G. H., David, D., DiLorenzo, T. A., & Schur, J. B. (2007). Response 
  expectancies and irrational beliefs predict exam-related distress. Journal of Rational-
 Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 25, 17-34. 
Muthen, L. K., & Muthen, B. O. (1998 - 2010). Mplus – Statistical analysis with latent 
 variables. User’s guide (6th ed). Muthen and Muthen: Los Angeles. 
Padesky, C. A., & Beck, A. T. (2003). Science and philosophy: comparison of cognitive 
  therapy and rational emotive behaviour therapy. Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy,
  17, 211–224.  
Riskind, J. H. (2004). Cognitive theory and research on generalized anxiety disorder. In 
  Leahy R. L. (Ed.), Contemporary cognitive therapy: Theory, research, and practice.
  London: The Guilford Press. 
 28 
 
Simms, L. J., Watson, D., & Doebbeling, B. N. (2002). Confirmatory factor analyses of 
 posttraumatic  stress symptoms in deployed and nondeployed veterans of the Gulf 
  war. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 111, 637–647. 
Solomon, A., Arnow, B. A., Gotlib, I. H., & Wind, B. (2003). Individualized measurement of
  irrational beliefs in remitted depressives. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 59, 439–
 455. 
Steiger, J. H. (1990). Structural model evaluation and modification: An interval estimation
  approach. Multivariate Behavioural Research, 25, 173-180. 
Tanaka, J. S. (1987). “How big is big enough?” Sample size and goodness of fit in 
 structural equation models with latent variables. Child Development, 58, 134–
 146. 
Tucker, L. R., & Lewis, C. (1973). The reliability coefficient for maximum likelihood factor 
 analysis. Psychometrika, 38, 1-10. 
Vandenberg, R. J. (2002). Toward a further understanding of an improvement in 
 measurement invariance methods and procedures. Organizational Research 
 Methods, 5(2), 139-158. 
Vogt, D. S., Shipherd, J. C., & Resick, P. A. (2012). Posttraumatic maladaptive beliefs scale:
  Evolution of the personal beliefs and reactions scale. Assessment, 9, 308-317. 
Vujanovic, A. A., Bonn-Miller, M. O., Potter, C. M., Marshall-Berenz, E. C., & Zvolensky
  M. J. (2011). An evaluation of the association between distress tolerance and 
 posttraumatic stress within a trauma-exposed sample. Journal of Psychopathology 
  and Behavioral Assessment, 33, 129–135. 
 29 
 
Yufik, T., & Simms, L. J. (2010). A meta-analytic investigation of the structure of  
  posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 119, 
 764-776. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
Table 1 
Standardized and Unstandardized Factor Loadings (and Standard Errors) for each latent 
variable 
Item β B SE 
 
PTS 
 
Intrusions 
 
.90 
 
1.00 
 
--- 
 
Avoidance .61 .39 .03 
 
Dysphoria .88 1.61 .08 
 
Hyperarousal 
 
.81 .48 .03 
Trauma-Specific Irrationality 
 
Demandingness 
 
.94 
 
1.00 
 
--- 
 
Catastrophizing .86 .98 .03 
 
Low Frustration Tolerance .83 .80 .04 
 
Depreciation 
 
.90 .96 .03 
General Irrationality 
 
Demandingness 
 
.92 
 
1.00 
 
--- 
 
Catastrophizing .90 .99 .03 
 
Low Frustration Tolerance .87 .95 .03 
 
Depreciation .88 1.07 .04 
Note. All Factor loadings are statistically significant (p < .001). 
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Figure 1 
REBT Fully Indirect model of Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: G-DEM = General Demandingness, G-CAT = General Catastrophizing, G-LFT = 
General Low Frustration Tolerance, G-DEP = General Depreciation, TS-DEM = Trauma-
Specific Demandingness, TS-CAT = Trauma-Specific Catastrophizing, TS-LFT = Trauma-
Specific Low Frustration Tolerance, TS-DEP = Trauma-Specific Depreciation, INT = 
Intrusions, AV = Avoidance, DYS = Dysphoria, HYP = Hyperarousal. Statistical 
significance: * p < .001 
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Figure 2 
REBT Direct and Indirect model of Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: G-DEM = General Demandingness, G-CAT = General Catastrophizing, G-LFT = 
General Low Frustration Tolerance, G-DEP = General Depreciation, TS-DEM = Trauma-
Specific Demandingness, TS-CAT = Trauma-Specific Catastrophizing, TS-LFT = Trauma-
Specific Low Frustration Tolerance, TS-DEP = Trauma-Specific Depreciation, INT = 
Intrusions, AV = Avoidance, DYS = Dysphoria, HYP = Hyperarousal. Statistical 
significance: * p < .001 
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